People who are disillusioned with the government showed it by not going to vote in the first round, but they may mobilize at the second round. Regardless of their feelings toward Sandu and the government of her Action and Solidarity Party, they don't want a pro-Russian president, says Eugen Muravschi, an expert at the Moldovan think tank WatchDog.MD Community.
This text has been auto-translated from Polish.
Paulina Siegien: What happened in Moldova on October 20? The final result of the elections and referendum is positive, but don't you have the feeling that something went badly wrong, especially given the pre-election predictions?.
Eugen Muravschi: The result of the referendum is positive, but the difference in the number of votes was small. I think that before the elections we underestimated the scale of the Russian operation, although we were aware that Russia had been building its network in Moldova for months and paying people to get involved. Russian agents failed to bribe many people on the day of the vote. For what it's worth, those who were paid by Russia for several months through oligarch Ilan Shor were numerous enough to sway the outcome of the election and referendum. These people were not visible in the opinion polls. When you conduct a poll, no one will tell you: "yes, I have pro-European views and want Moldova to join the EU, but I got money from Shor, so I will vote against it." There was no such thing in either the surveys or the in-depth interviews. That's why it was so difficult to estimate this phenomenon.
Wojciech Siegień: Would people who have pro-European views really be willing to vote against constitutional changes in a referendum for money?
Those who are deeply convinced of the idea of European integration are unlikely to. But already undecided voters may have done so. In the results of the referendum, we see that regions of Moldova that were previously pro-European voted against the constitutional changes. This was unexpected.
W.S.: How can this be explained?
The campaign that the government and Mai Sandu's entourage ran was inadequate. They were too confident. All the polls showed a fairly certain advantage for the pro-European option, so they thought it would be a piece of cake. More needed to be done, to better explain the purpose and meaning of the referendum vote. According to our Watchdog research, about a third of respondents did not understand the question on the ballot. It was not a simple question like: "Do you want to join the European Union?" It was a question about support for constitutional changes, with specific articles indicated, so people didn't quite know what they were voting on and what would happen if one option or the other won.
Besides, voters who vote for pro-Western and pro-European forces are more demanding and critical. If they felt disappointed with the conduct of the government and the president - and they had good reason to do so - they simply did not go to vote. Pro-Russian voters are more punitive and better organized in this regard. Pro-Russian forces also managed to successfully convince people that this is not a referendum at all, which is about the European future, but a referendum of the popularity of the government and Sandu herself. Don't like the current government? Simple, vote no in the referendum to show it. The bottom line is that some people voted no in this referendum because they were paid off and didn't really have an opinion on the issue and didn't understand what European integration is all about, and some because they are disappointed with the current government.
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The government and Maia Sandu have been unable to build tension around this election as an election that decides the future, the path of development for the next hundred years. Instead, there was talk of a "Sandu referendum" from the beginning. The very way it was announced, linking the referendum to the president, was a mistake. There were also accusations against her that she was unable to build a broad pro-European coalition. The referendum should have been presented as a joint project of all pro-European forces in the country, not just one party. This has not happened.
P.S.: In addition to political actors, there are also social actors, such as NGOs, which also conduct their campaigns in connection with the elections, usually pro-frequency ones. .
Watchdog was part of the Citizens for Europe initiative, in which we visited smaller towns and cities around the country to talk to people, to explain to them the meaning of the referendum. But we don't have the kind of staff or resources that the government or the ruling party has. We only have a few volunteers. I myself have been to 12 localities. At the same time, other NGOs also conducted similar campaigns. But even with this effort, if the government and political parties neglect the campaign, we as NGOs cannot compensate. We are not there to do their work for them.
P.S.: What questions and concerns did the people you met with in the Citizens for Europe campaign have?
As I said, many people did not understand the referendum question. They said, "Yes, we want to join Europe, but if we vote yes in the referendum, will Sandu be able to do what she wants with the Constitution?" We had to explain that no, that it was only about two specific modifications. I also remember an elderly lady who said: "Shor gave me 600 lei to vote for him. If PAS gives me 1,000, I will vote for them." She said this very openly. Pro-European local politicians have often complained that Shor's organization buys the votes of the poorest and most vulnerable people. For many of them, especially pensioners, it was a way to provide bread, to buy basic goods. Money from Shor sometimes even doubled their basic income.
W.S.: So everyone knew and saw everything, but had no idea how to fight this practice effectively?.
The police carried out actions and investigations in this matter, tried to confiscate money from people who brought it into the country. But beyond that, what could be done? After all, they couldn't arrest 100,000 people. I hope that those who were at the top of this pyramid can be arrested and tried. Another thing is that the police investigate, collect evidence, and then the rest is up to the prosecutor. It is up to the prosecutor's office to decide whether the case will go to court and with what charges. I hope this whole system will work more effectively before the second round of the presidential election. And it will continue to work, because next year we have parliamentary elections, and we can't afford to let Russia with Shor continue to weave a pro-Kremlin web in Moldova and buy votes.
P.S.: In the first round of elections, Maia Sandu was the only pro-European candidate. If Aleksandr Stoianoglo, her rival in the second round, captures the votes of even some of the other candidates, then....
She is likely to win a majority and become the new president.
P.S.: Even before the election, this was an unbelievable scenario.
Usually a pro-European candidate gains additional votes in the second round. People who are disillusioned with the government showed it by not going to vote in the first round, but they may mobilize at the second round. Regardless of their feelings toward Sandu and her Action and Solidarity Party government, they don't want a pro-Russian president. So there is still some room for an increase in support for her. On the other hand, among the pro-Russian candidates, not all are on friendly terms. I am not convinced that they will be able to form a united front. Therefore, I think Maia Sandu still has a chance to win.
S.: What would a Stoianoglo victory mean for Moldova's European aspirations?.
We would still have a pro-Western parliament and government for at least a year. Moldova is not a presidential republic, so Stoianoglo's prerogatives would be limited. Only a majority in parliament for the party from which the president hails gives him more options. His win carries risks precisely because it will be followed more likely by a win for pro-Russian forces in parliamentary elections next year.
P.S.: Is there still time to create a new pro-European political force? A party, a movement?.
There were attempts to build a European coalition for the presidential elections, but the parties that were supposed to participate did not get along. Apart from PAS, they have very low support, sometimes as low as 1 percent, so they do not give hope that in the new parliament Sandu would have someone to form a coalition with. Maybe someone new will emerge, but time is short, and of those pro-European parties that are currently active, none, in my opinion, has a chance of crossing the 5 percent electoral threshold.
W.S.: After the first round of the presidential election and after the announcement of the referendum results, are you worried about Moldova's future, its European aspirations?.
It is worrisome, but the final result showed that the referendum was approved. By a small majority, but nevertheless, the pro-European option won. And this means that the constitution will be amended. The goal of joining the EU will be written into it. This is very important. Despite the setbacks we saw on October 20, I think Maia Sandu is the favorite for the second round of elections. If she wins, it will also send a good signal before the parliamentary elections. Her voters will be more mobilized, more optimistic. But if Stoianoglo wins the presidential election now, it will certainly pose a risk to Moldova's European, pro-Western trajectory.
P.S.: To successfully win support for the idea of European integration, one needs not only the commitment of politicians in Moldova, but also the support of the European Union itself, its institutions, its member countries. Is it sufficient?
Politicians from the EU and the countries that belong to the EU come to Moldova, we also have cooperation at many levels, study visits, etc. I see a certain problem in the fact that it is difficult to determine the total amount of the EU contribution in Moldova. These are various funds and investments, some of them going through the European Investment Bank, some through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, some in the form of soft projects for NGOs, some as hard investments in the country's various regions. So when someone asks me about it, I can say that the Union gives us a lot, but I don't know how much specifically. The EU institutions could be more transparent in this regard, because politicians and people with pro-Russian views build such an argument: The Union gives some money all the time, but we can't even check whether all of it goes where it should, and whether the government isn't stealing it, because we don't know exactly what sums are involved.
S.: Moldova has a large neighbor that is a member of the EU, with which it has very close cultural, linguistic and historical ties. Does Romania have its own, not so much separate from the EU's, but special policy toward Moldova?.
Bilateral relations are very intense, Romania supports Moldova in various forms. It is economic cooperation, but also the role of our advocate in Brussels, which Bucharest takes on. Unfortunately, Romanian politicians have tended to bet on the wrong horses in Moldova. Whenever they tried to support one or another pro-Western and pro-European party, they always chose the wrong one. They once supported former Chisinau mayor Dorin Chirtoacă of the Liberal Party. Chirtoacă had studied in Romania, was friends with Romanian politicians, and was considered the great young hope of Moldovan politics. But then his party got caught up in corruption schemes, and allied itself with Plahotniuć (a corrupt oligarch, accused of human trafficking, among other things, who subjugated most areas of the Moldovan state and economy in the second decade of the 21st century - ed. note), and then fell apart.
People in both Moldova and Romania were left disillusioned. It must be admitted, by the way, that the Romanian authorities were overly tolerant of Plahotniuc and many Moldovans resented it. Now they look favorably on Chisinau Mayor Ion Ceban, who has been pro-Russian all his life and now pretends to be pro-European. The Romanian Social Democrats seem to have high hopes for him. Although his pro-Europeanism has manifested itself lately mainly in the fact that at least he didn't agitate against the referendum. Always something. We'll see with the parliamentary elections what goal Ceban is playing for, but he's a very opportunistic politician, so another volte-face can be expected.
S.: From what you say, it seems that politicians in Moldova are rarely idealists, and more often just opportunists. .
Many pro-Russian politicians in Moldova are opportunists who simply like money. And pro-Russianism guarantees a sizable slice of the pie at the start, since it is approx. 30 percent of the population. Even Ilan Shor was not immediately pro-Russian, he once even invited MEPs from Italy to Moldova. It ended in an affair that they let themselves be invited by the oligarch who financed the visit. But the openly pro-Russian Shor only stayed when he started having trouble in Moldova. So yes, many politicians are in politics just for the money.
S.: Maybe it's better if they are opportunists in love with money than if they are genuinely committed to the idea of Rus mir? At least there is some room for maneuver here..
Indeed, what they are authentically attached to is Russian money, but unfortunately Russia has a lot of money, especially for Moldovan conditions. With this money you can buy yourself a party, for example. Until recently, the best way to identify which political party in Moldova is the Kremlin's favorite was to watch which TV channel retransmits Russian propaganda programs. Initially, these were the channels controlled by the Socialist Party, then they switched to Shor's channels. This change was also a sign that Russia is betting on Shor in Moldova as a force to advance Moscow's political interests. In 2022, retransmission of Russian channels was banned, but before that, these were the most popular TV programs in the country. Russian TV is rich, so it had a better offer than Moldovan stations. Not only political and journalistic programs, but also movies, series, entertainment. Our stations could not compete with this offer.
S.: If the votes of the diaspora were subtracted from the results of the October 20 referendum, it would turn out that in Moldova itself the pro-European option lost..
You say to subtract the diaspora votes, and I say to subtract the votes that Shor bought - then it will turn out that the situation is not so bad. This is such a speculative exercise in electoral math. If we didn't have Russian electoral corruption at home, perhaps we wouldn't need the diaspora in the West. But right now its influence is acting as a balancing force between Shor's and Russia's actions. In previous presidential elections, Igor Dodon used the argument that the Diaspora should not decide for us. But actually, why not? Without the money the diaspora sends, our economy would collapse. Since the diaspora sends a billion euros a year to the country, I guess it can have an impact on what happens in Moldova?
S. Is the Romanian policy, which allows Moldovans to obtain a Romanian passport quite easily, playing a positive role in the EU integration process? Maybe people are not mobilizing politically on this issue, because in fact more than half of them are already EU citizens?.
Romanian passports have allowed Moldovans to see Europe. This allows them to travel and confront European reality with at least the message of Russian propaganda. Many of our country's citizens work in European Union countries. They can do it legally, they work in better conditions than if they were labor migrants from outside the community, they have social and legal protection. I don't think this is a bad thing. Romanian citizenship has allowed many Moldovans to have a better life in the European Union, sending more money home, which is important for our economy. Besides, to their families back home, these people tell good things about Europe, set it as an example. Perhaps many people who would have gone to work in Russia went to Europe because they were given a Romanian passport. Overall, it was a good thing for us. Even Russian-speaking Moldovans often have Romanian passports, although they don't know a word of Romanian.
P.S.: People in high government positions can have the passport of a foreign country?.
Maia Sandu has a Romanian passport. In Moldova, more than half the population has or has already applied for Romanian citizenship.
S.: When there is some kind of peace agreement, hopefully one that will be favorable to Ukraine, will it also change the socio-political atmosphere in Moldova?.
When the full-scale war began in 2022, pro-Russian sentiment in Moldovan society subsided, and the number of people who wanted integration with the West increased. But over time, people got used to the new reality and the percentage of one and the other returned to the pre-war norm. The nucleus of the pro-Russian electorate in our country is about 25-30 percent of the population. I am not convinced that even when Ukraine wins the war, or when the war ends in a way that provides Ukraine with security and development opportunities, these people will stop sympathizing with Russia. But the end of the war will certainly breathe more optimism into pro-Western Moldovans and may sway voters who are undecided and now sit perched on the fence between old and new, Russia and Europe. Such people will then find it easier to make a decision.
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Eugen Muravschi - an expert at the Moldovan think tank WatchDog.MD Community, which focuses on building public resilience against disinformation and manipulative narratives. WatchDog.MD's mission is to build an environment for democratic development in the country by monitoring social and political processes.
