Ukrainian society has internalized a strong sense of messianism. While it is needed in times of war, Ukrainian authorities should learn that what works in the domestic situation will not necessarily bring the desired results in foreign policy, says Maria Piechowska, Ukraine analyst at the Eastern Europe Program of the Polish Institute of International Affairs.
This text has been auto-translated from Polish.
Kaja Puto: The war in Ukraine has been going on for more than two and a half years. How has Ukrainian society changed under its influence?".
Maria Piekhovskaya: First of all, it has united them, because the society used to be strongly divided. Ukrainian historians and political scientists argued about how many Ukrainians there were - some were of the opinion that there were twenty-two, or as many regions, while others emphasized the division into east and west. After the outbreak of full-scale war, this debate ceased to have a raison d'être. The role of the Ukrainian language increased, pro-Russian views became a thing of the past, the faithful left the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Society oriented itself en masse to the West.
Cities that were previously full of traces of Russian identity have also become Zukrainized. On the streets of Odesa, which I recently visited, the Ukrainian flag is painted on every building. The pedestal where the monument to Tsarina Catherine once stood has been transformed into a memorial dedicated to fallen soldiers. And Catherine Square is called European Square.
The war also unleashed a huge social mobilization.
There was none before .
There was - Ukrainian civil society is a worldwide phenomenon. If it hadn't been for the Orange Revolution, and then the Revolution of Dignity and the volunteer battalions in Donbas, Ukraine would no longer exist. We are talking about ordinary people taking matters into their own hands: getting involved in action, organizing. However, after the outbreak of full-scale war, Ukrainians have surpassed themselves. Collecting for equipment, getting involved in aid by, for example, making camouflage nets, helping internally displaced people - these are daily occurrences. But Ukrainian civil society also plays an important watchdog role - looking at the authorities' hands. It has led, for example, to the reinstatement of the need for deputies of the Verkhovna Rada to submit asset declarations.
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The public mobilization after the invasion is also partly due to Volodymyr Zelenskiy's brilliant information policy - all those grandmothers throwing cucumbers, tractors towing Russian tanks or, finally, the footage of border guards from Snake Island talking to a Russian warship, which is being promoted everywhere.
Ukrainians, after two and a half years of war, still believe strongly in victory. But this is also a trap. Because for most, victory means regaining all territory within the 1991 borders. And, as we know, this is increasingly difficult.
The heroine of one of my reports once told me that the war taught Ukrainians to be assertive. That they have learned to refuse, curse and even threaten. This can be seen, I think, even at the level of foreign policy conducted by Ukraine..
This is a strength and a threat at the same time. In conversations with Ukrainian politicians or experts, I often bring up the future of Polish-Ukrainian relations. I point out that EU negotiations will require Ukraine to seek the support of each of the countries for which, as a member of the Union, it will become a competitor. That is, for example, with Poland - undoubtedly the topic of negotiations between us will be agriculture. This is difficult for most to understand - they assume that since Ukraine is defending Europe against Russia, it should get certain things in return.
Ukrainian society has internalized a strong sense of messianism. It is undoubtedly needed in times of war, while the Ukrainian authorities should also learn that what works and is needed in the domestic situation, to keep morale high, will not necessarily bring the desired results in foreign policy. Politics, as a rule, is not based on emotions.
War also means the militarization of discourse. I see two trends in Ukraine in this context. On the one hand, the Ukrainian Internet is full of brutal memes about "butchering the hangovers" - these emotions are really hardly surprising - on the other hand, one can see a lot of efforts to show that Ukrainians are different from Russians, that even in the conditions of a bloody war they are just, empathetic, humanitarian..
Of course, there is a lot of hatred of Russia in Ukraine - something that was not there before.
I recently saw a street poll in which the presenter provocatively asked Ukrainians on the street if they were Russophobic. And one lady answered very significantly that there was no Russophobia in Ukraine, but let the Russians wait until the children who lived through the war grow up, then they will see what Russophobia is..
Perhaps if there had not been a full-scale invasion, if Vladimir Putin had limited himself to the war in Donbas, Ukraine might no longer exist, because the pro-Russian and pro-European parts of society would have devoured each other, and as a result the former option would have won. Today, however, Ukraine no longer has the option of being a Russia sympathizer.
Either way, this "humanitarian" narrative seems stronger. Ukrainians don't want to be bestial like the Russians murdering and torturing civilians in occupied towns, which, for example, happened in Bucza and other sub-Kyivsk towns. For them, it is important to behave according to social and humanitarian norms. They are aware that the West expects this of them, but they also identify themselves with this attitude. They dissociate themselves from "barbaric" Russia. This can be seen in the way they treat prisoners of war and, more recently, in how the so-called Kursk operation is conducted and communicated. The Ukrainians are giving a strong message that they are ready to create humanitarian corridors that Russia does not want, that they care about civilians in the occupied territories.
Emphasis is also placed on the soldiers' empathetic approach to the animals left behind by the Russians. And while, of course, animal abandonment by people evacuating in panic happens on both sides of the border, what is important is what happens to them afterwards. Are there organizations that will fight for these animals, take care of them, and will this become a topic of debate.
At the same time, support for gun ownership is growing.
Of course, everyone wants to be able to defend themselves. Everyone remembers the scenes from Bucha and similar ones from other localities. According to estimates by Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko, Ukrainians may now own up to five million unregistered weapons. This militarization of society is more than that, however. In a March 2024 Razumkov Center survey, nearly three out of four Ukrainians indicated that they approve of introducing military-patriotic education from kindergarten.
In the face of threats from Russia, this strengthens their resilience, but in the long term it could reflect negatively on society. Thousands of veterans with war trauma combined with widespread access to weapons is a recipe for increased crime. The potential radicalization of former soldiers will probably also be a Polish problem, as some portion of them will come in search of work or simply joining their families. At the same time, it will be a topic that Russian propaganda will certainly want to exploit to pit Poles against Ukrainians.
What is the Ukrainian state doing for veterans and could it do more?
The topic of supporting veterans is not new - the war in Ukraine has been going on since 2014. However, we are now talking about a completely different scale. Veterans, especially those who have been wounded, receive some assistance from the state. The flagship project is the Lviv-based Unbroken Rehabilitation Center, which focuses on comprehensive assistance to war victims. But systemic support is also needed to help veterans return to normal life. Here there is still a lot of work ahead for Ukraine.
Veterans also often have trouble finding work. Many employers are afraid to hire them because of potential psychological problems or by arguing that a soldier who gave orders will not find himself as a subordinate. On top of that, the labor market - and Ukrainian cities, by the way - is not adapted to people with disabilities. Fortunately, Ukraine has a lot of potential to change this - due to the high level of digitization of society and the activity of the IT sector.
Mental health problems affect not only veterans .
The whole society is traumatized. According to World Health Organization estimates, mental problems - primarily PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorder - author's note], anxiety disorders and depression - are experienced by about 10 million Ukrainians, or about one in three of the country's population. The health care system was not very efficient when it came to psychiatric care even before the war, and now it is additionally short of personnel. Many medics have gone to serve in the army, while others have left - to Poland, for example, which is a very receptive market when it comes to doctors and nurses from Ukraine. In addition, many facilities have been destroyed, making it even more difficult for the state to provide effective assistance.
How then do Ukrainians help themselves?
There is, of course, a growing understanding of mental health issues. The media is paying a lot of attention to how to cope with the stress of war. But with the scale of the problem and the lack of specialists, the problem will affect society for decades.
In the face of poor support for veterans, care for them rests largely on the shoulders of women - their wives or mothers. Does war mean a regression for women's rights?".
On the contrary. Every war brings the emancipation of women - it always has and always will. I don't want to say that the situation of Ukrainian women was bad before the war, but certainly gender roles or divisions between the female and male worlds were stronger than in Poland. Women were less likely to drive cars, and at family events it was common to see a division between the women's table and the men's table. This changed over the years, but the war strongly accelerated this change.
Women have to fend for themselves - they have become the heads of families. They are the ones who, as refugees, have to find their way in the new environment. Some are also volunteering for the army. Many Ukrainian women have begun to take jobs in professions that were previously considered "masculine." They work as steelworkers and even miners.
This is the result of manpower shortages. We know the scale of Ukraine's depopulation .
We don't know the exact numbers, because there hasn't been a census in Ukraine for years. In 2022, there was talk of 41 million residents, while current estimates of the post-war situation range from 25 to 37 million people.
At least 6.5 million fled to the West, and an unknown number of Ukrainians also left - or were forced to leave - for Russia. The exact number of casualties from the war is unknown - official UN figures put the death toll at 11,500, but AP estimates that up to 75,000 people may have died in Mariupol alone. In turn, the loss of military personnel, according to journalists' estimates, could reach 100,000. Adding to the problem is the increasingly low fertility rate. In the history of independent Ukraine, its rate has never reached replacement level (2.1-2.2), but according to wartime estimates it is now only 0.7.
Some portion of the refugees will not return to Ukraine from Western countries, and as long as the war continues, there is also no prospect of making up the shortfall with migrants. Ukraine is depopulating. This raises a number of serious problems that will only get worse once the war is over. Ukraine's pension system is based on the solidarity of generations, besides that there is already a shortage of labor.
Will the reintegration of refugees be quite a challenge? Some of the Ukrainians who stayed in the country call the refugees traitors. I was in Nikolaev a few days ago after it stopped being heavily shelled and the mass return of residents began. Those who survived the worst days in the city were annoyed at these returnees: that where were they when the city needed them, that they couldn't drive on unlit streets, that they were indigent and expected miracles from the city government..
On the one hand there is talk of betrayal, and on the other hand there is talk that these are women who care about the future of the nation, i.e. Ukrainian children, and that it is important that these children have security. There will probably be some tensions around this, but in my opinion the bigger conflict will be born between the veterans and the men who chose not to fight. Those who do not fight, for the most part, also contribute to the defense of the country - for example, by working and thus supporting the operation of the economy, which is essential to the survival of the country. But a veteran will say: no, you're not a patriot because you didn't enlist.
Despite everything, the Ukrainian economy is barely surviving. Important pre-war industrial plants are not functioning. Do Ukrainians have an idea for a post-war rebound .
The Ukrainian economy will radically change, or rather, it is already changing. Some companies have relocated to the west, but some - including the industrial plants you mentioned - have simply been razed to the ground - such as the Azovstal plant in Mariupol and Azoty in Severodonetsk. The great hope is the IT sector, which is growing despite the war. It is thanks to it that Ukraine has managed to achieve such a remarkable level of digitization. One example is the state application Dija - it's practically the state on the Internet. With its help one can pay taxes, open a business, take part in a tender, register the birth of a child, and recently even get married online.
Another industry with high hopes is the arms industry, which is growing despite Russia's constant attacks on such facilities. The war has forced not only production, but also the creation of new solutions - Ukrainian drones are a flagship example.
The Kursk Operation rekindled hopes for a fairer outcome to the war. Does the prospect of rebuilding the country after the war inspire fears or rather hopes?.
It's hard to say. I think Ukrainians are not looking so far ahead with their thoughts. They are happy about the first positive news from the front in many months, namely the Kursk operation, but they do not expect an imminent end to the conflict. They are aware that it will not be easy and there is still a lot ahead of them. That is why it is important that Poland and other allied countries continue to support them. So that they know that we have not forgotten them.
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Maria Piechowska - Ukraine Analyst at the Eastern Europe Program of the Polish Institute of International Affairs. She works on foreign and domestic policy and socio-cultural issues of Ukraine, as well as migration. A graduate of the Institute of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology at the University of Warsaw, she received her BA in Eastern European Studies at the UW. Co-author of the book German Laundry Powder and Polnische wirtschaft. Polish seasonal workers in Germany (Warsaw: Scholar 2016).
