What Wagenknecht preaches is often an attempt to revitalize the ideas of social democracy from decades ago: a welfare state protecting its market and controlling its borders, collective security arrangements instead of military pacts such as NATO, says UW political scientist Prof. Rafal Chwedoruk.
This text has been auto-translated from Polish.
James Majmurek: The Sahra Wagenknecht Movement (BSW) is causing problems for commentators and political scientists, having difficulty classifying it ideologically and placing it on the left-right axis. How would you categorize this new political creation? Is it populist left, conservative left, a variation of the far right, alt-left?.
Rafal Chwedoruk: I would say that the root of the problem is the crisis of social democracy, which has been going on since the 1970s, with a short break during the Blair and Schröder era. The left is trying to give two different answers to it. So different, in fact, that some researchers even claim that for half a century we have been dealing with the existence of two different lefts, which, even if they function within the framework of one party, remain something fundamentally different: on the one hand there is the new left, with its roots in the youth revolts of the 1960s and 1970s, and on the other the traditional social democracy.
Wagenknecht has spoken and written about this duality many times, including in her 2022 book Die Selbstgerechten (Self-Righteous). There he attacks the new left, which he calls the "lifestyle left," which comes mainly from the academic middle class. He accuses it of confining itself to its own circle, of seeing its own privileges as a virtue and giving them a moral dimension, rejecting any discussion a priori. The academic class generally speaks languages, which makes it naturally more "cosmopolitan" and gives it a competitive advantage in a globalized economy.
To this left, Wagenknecht contrasts a community-based left, concerned about its social cohesion, focusing mainly on redistribution, which must be done by the nation-state. This left rejects identity politics, viewing it as a threat to the community, to equality. It also has a peculiar attitude toward migration, which is the main reason for the problem of classifying the Wagenknecht movement.
His position on migration is not simply right-wing? .
A French politician once said that France cannot take in all the poverty of the world. And it wasn't a man from the National Front at all, but Michel Rocard - Mitterand's Socialist prime minister from 1988 to 1991. Few remember that during the rule of the Popular Front in France (1936-1938), the biggest complaints about migration came from communist mayors of small industrial cities, who had the hardest time grappling with the cost of taking in people from other countries - often from Poland, by the way.
So a certain Wagenknecht Euroskepticism is nothing new on the left. In the early days, after all, resistance to the common market came mainly from social democratic parties and trade unions. In sum, what Wagenknecht preaches is often an attempt to revitalize the ideas of social democracy from decades ago: a welfare state protecting its market and controlling its borders, collective security arrangements instead of military pacts such as NATO - the latter perspective is completely absent in Poland.
The Wagenknecht movement is therefore simply an anachronistic retro-social democracy?.
Not quite so anachronistic, similar ideas are being taken up by other left-wing parties in Europe: Robert Ficy's Smer in Slovakia, Sinn Féin in Ireland, to some extent traditional post-communist Romanian Social Democracy, and the Bulgarian Socialist Party. Skepticism about migration is also displayed by the Danish Social Democracy, led by Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, who will govern the country from 2019. One could - although it sounds rather paradoxical - even see some common points between Wagenknecht's program and Blairism.
In what sense?
Mainly economic. Although the word "socialism" falls very often in the new party's documents, there are really no ideas that socialize the economy.
Wagenknecht spoke a lot about support for cooperatives or fighting against too-big-to-fail, monopolistic corporations.
Yes, but at the same time BSW is not really proposing anything that violates the market mechanism. Wagenknecht also alludes to ideas of ordoliberalism, associated with the post-war revival of the West German economy. There is also a certain Enlightenment spirit to BSW's Blairism, emphasizing the importance of unity or cultural community - rejecting the search for differences in the name of identity politics. Today, Blair is highly skeptical of what is happening on the left in the area of culture and identity politics.
Wagenknecht also shares with him a globalization mindset. Let's go back to migration: BSW is not against it, it calls for more investment in the living conditions of migrants in Germany. Wagenknecht herself has immigrant Iranian roots, the movement's leadership includes descendants of migrants, and the formal co-chair is Amira Mohamed Ali, who has Egyptian roots. At the same time - which is not Blairian - Wagenknecht has always paid attention to the costs of migration for the countries from which migrants come. For emigration can be a form of brain drain. When the educated middle class leaves, the development opportunities of the countries they leave weaken.
In Germany, in the reality of a democracy peculiar for its historical entanglements, it is the position of the BSW toward migration that is the source of the greatest misunderstandings and fears. In Poland - the movement's attitude toward Russia and foreign policy. The BSW's program documents mention the names of Willy Brandt and Gorbachev, figures completely forgotten in the Polish debate, but for some Germans a symbol of the aspiration that 1945 should never be repeated.
Wagenknecht's pro-Russian program is also a reiteration of the old message of the German left, or something else, however?.
It is largely a return to the tradition of Brandt's Ostpolitik. On the other hand, I would argue whether her position is so pro-Russian. This is not a program of German-Russian cooperation in the style of that of Bismarck or the Weimar Republic, in the spirit of Rapallo. The BSW's attitude toward Russia is defined not so much by its philo-Russianism as by the now forgotten pacifist tradition of the German left.
By the way, it is very interesting that the party most criticized by Wagenknecht today is the Greens, who, under current conditions, are the most pro-American and "hawkish" in foreign policy in Germany. Which, given the party's origins in the countercultural, pacifist movements of the 1960s, is rather ironic. In addition, surveys show that there is virtually no flow of the electorate from the Greens to the BSW - the Wagenknecht movement instead takes voters away from Die Linke, the SPD and even the Liberals.
BSW, which completely escapes Polish reception, is strongly philo-European on strategic issues, despite its skepticism about the way the Union and its institutions function. It speaks of the need to build strategic independence for Europe, and draws attention to the contradiction of its interests and those of the US. In the movement's policy documents, for example, specific American big tech companies are mentioned in a critical context. Which, in turn, connects to a broader phenomenon: the resistance of traditional economic sectors, based on industrial production, to the new digital economy. In Germany, it is particularly evident, as is the fear of deindustrialization, as seen in the recent campaign for the European Parliament.
Also related to this is BSW's very specific approach to climate policy. On the one hand, the movement does not question the existence of the problem of environmental destruction, while on the other it fears the consequences of the green transition and warns against radical activism.
Jeremy Cliffe, analyzingthe BSW's proposals in November 2023 in the pages of the New Statesman, pointed out that the movement fails to see the potential for industrial development offered to Germany by the green transition. Also on climate issues, isn't the BSW simply stuck in the past?.
BSW is aware of the need for a green transformation, and is not opposed to new green technologies, only to raising costs for consumers, but also for medium-sized companies, which occupy a lot of space in the movement's program in general. It would like the green transformation to proceed like the German mining reform, which has been going on since the 1950s: spread over decades, taking place with social dialogue, with the participation of unions.
The BSW's success in the elections in Thuringia and Saxony is due to East German peculiarities? Will the movement be able to translate it into success in other states?".
BSW has an offer that today fits perfectly especially with the expectations of residents of the eastern states who feel disillusioned with mainstream German politics, but for various reasons do not want to vote for the AfD. And especially female residents, because it is already clear that the votes for the AfD and the Sahra Wagenknecht Movement are gender-polarized, with men more likely to vote for the former party and women for the BSW.
To what extent this movement will be able to make more headway in the states that once belonged to West Germany depends on how much economic and political perturbation Germany will still face. How citizens will assess the risk of Germany being dragged into a war with Russia, what the cost of living issue will be, what shape the German economy will be in. The greater the turbulence, the greater the chances of BSW.
Wagenknecht also favors the fact that she is a very pragmatic politician. The full name of her party is Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht - Vernunft und Gerechtigkeit, or Sahra Wagenknecht Movement - Reason and Justice. "Reason" on the one hand refers to that Enlightenment tradition I mentioned, on the other hand it can simply mean reason. The BSW often presents itself as a party that appeals to common sense, not necessarily to ideology. Wagenknecht very consciously does not situate his movement as a classic force to the left of social democracy, as Die Linke did. He doesn't want to confine himself to that niche; he is looking for voters outside it.
Will the BSW now play a key role in Thuringia and Saxony? And can it enter national governments?".
Let's look at the broader German political context. All indications are that the CDU will be back in power next year. So the Khadecks are anxious to weaken the SPD, the party that will most likely be its main coalition partner. For this purpose, the BSW, as a movement capable of winning the support of poorer East Germans, is perfectly suited - remember that in 2021 Olaf Scholz became chancellor largely thanks to the votes of pensioners from the former GDR.
The CDU may therefore take a gamble with Wagenknecht to weaken the SPD. Especially since this will cost the Christian Democrats nothing politically, and the SPD is, in addition, strongly divided over the war in Ukraine. It would be very beneficial for the CDU in the long term if Wagenknecht were to build a second, more traditional social democracy alongside the SPD. She, however, will not limit herself in her options, for example, by making prohibitive demands on possible partners at the entrance. Scholz is aware of this danger. The chancellor's recent "dovish" statements about the war in Ukraine can be read precisely as a reaction to the BSW's successes in Saxony and Thuringia.
When the Wagenknecht Movement was formed, there was talk that it could pick up support from the AfD. The results from Saxony and Thuringia verify these expectations? In both states, the AfD's support increased compared to previous state elections, and the BSW's successes seem to have hurt mainly Die Linke, the party from which Wagenknecht emerged to found the new formation..
It is worth remembering that the south of the former GDR after German reunification has always been more right-wing than Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, not to mention Berlin. Saxony has long been ruled by the CDU and will continue to rule, although it is unclear in what configuration.
Surveys show that BSW voters are much more left-wing than AfD voters, and virtually the only bridge between the two parties' electorates is migration. So the BSW can't be counted on to suddenly take voters away from the Alternative - although many say they might vote for Wagenknecht's formation - it could instead limit its expansion. As happened in Denmark, where the Social Democrats, led by Frederiksen, blocked the exodus of the working-class electorate, mainly from the working-class suburbs of Copenhagen, to the anti-immigrant Right.
The future of the AfD, on the other hand, will depend mainly on the CDU. On whether the party decides to govern with the Alternative. If the Liberals fall under the threshold, if the Greens and the mainstream left weaken, this cannot be ruled out.
And do you think the BSW could become part of some kind of ruling coalition in Germany?
Given the pragmatic orientation of the BSW, this is not out of the question, and Wagenknecht can be flexible. Similar to the BSW's demonstrated approach to migration is gradually penetrating the leftist mainstream. It has already happened in Denmark. This penetration can also be seen in Germany, for example in the Scholz government's recent decisions to reinstate border controls.
Do you think a similar left-wing party could emerge in Poland? There is no room in our country for an anti-American party, but is there room for a left that is skeptical of migration and more culturally conservative? When Paulina Matysiak announced the formation of the "Yes to Development" Association , she was compared to Wagenknecht..
In Poland, as in Hungary, it is too late for this, the window of opportunity has closed. The moment to build a similar formation was when the current party division, based on the PO-PiS polarization, was taking shape. At that time, a left-wing party could have emerged with, let's say, a moderate cultural agenda, similar to the PO of the time, and an economic agenda not much different from the PiS of the time. The SLD tried for a while to go down this path, balancing between the two poles, with not too bad results, such as the party's performance in the 2010 local elections and Napieralski's result in the presidential elections, in which he came third, winning more than 13.5 percent of the vote.
Since 2010, however, much has changed politically and socially in Poland. Divisions have deepened and various axes of contention have overlapped: economic, cultural, center-periphery. No force capable of tearing this tangle apart can be seen today. It is certainly not the Left.
Its foray into identity politics facilitated its return to the Diet in 2019. But it does not provide space for development. In Poland today, as in Turkey and Israel, the Left is the most culturally radical faction of the broad liberal camp. The defeats of any independent attempt by the Together party to take off show that there is no room for a different left, one with a strong socio-economic orientation.
Together has always been a very culturally progressive party that has never tried to temper its message under more conservative voters.
The electorate that the BSW-type left is reaching for is not necessarily conservative, just has different priorities than those raised by the "lifestyle left." The only successful populist movement in Poland from outside the right capable of reaching out to the social electorate was Samoobrona. But its electorate, too, has spread to PiS and Platform. Which shows that this duopoly - as much as we would complain about it - reflects how Polish society is realistically divided in the 21st century.
On the other hand, there are two lessons to be learned from the successes of the BSW for Polish political life. First, the Left cannot pretend indefinitely that it is not in crisis and sit ocratically on the barricade, as the SPD did for years. As a result, a party with more than 150 years of tradition, millions of voters, a still powerful membership base, is today very deeply divided internally and increasingly helpless in the face of the challenges brought by the modern world. Second, in good times, it is possible to pretend for years that Western Europe and the United States have no conflicting interests. But these contradictions do exist. Poland, too, will have to define itself in the face of them and find its way somehow. Especially if Trump wins in November.
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Rafał Chwedoruk - political scientist, PhD in humanities, professor at the University of Warsaw.
